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Do not try to live forever. You will not succeed.
George Bernard Shaw
Mr T. Ragic presented with a thrombosed limb of an aortobifemoral graft placed over 2 decades ago. He has unresectable
stage VI lung cancer and do not resuscitate (DNR) orders that were suspended during the thrombectomy. A cardiac arrest
resulted in him being in the intensive care unit a day later ventilator-dependent and comatose, and repeated computed
tomography scans show severe cerebral edema. He has frequent ventricular dysrhythmias. His eldest daughter is about to
deliver his first grandchild, which is the main reason that he requested the procedure to extend his life. In discussions with
the family, they express uncertainty about the implications of his DNR order for current treatment. They ask you for your
thinking on this matter. ( J Vasc Surg 2008;48:1630-32.)A. DNR clearly was the patient’s wish, indicating all ther-
apy must be discontinued.
B. DNR has no basis in making decisions about current
treatment but only to avoid resuscitation. Continue all
other indicated therapy.
C. DNR means that the disastrous operating room resus-
citation was unethical.
D. DNR suspension continues until the aftermath is re-
solved.
E. DNR orders result in clinical maltreatment.
“End-of-life” euphemizes the beginning of death.
Knowledge stops at the end-of-life; death being our universal
material finality. Francis Bacon characterized the human emo-
tions associated with death as, “Fear such as a small child has of
the darkness.”1 Death motivates the existence of religion, the
medical profession, and gravediggers. Many of the world’s
great monuments, including the Great Pyramids, the Taj
Mahal, the Mausoleum at Halicarnassus, Saint Peter’s Basilica,
and the dynastic tombs of the Shang and the Han, are repre-
sentations not only of the awe with which we confront death
but also of our efforts to magically project life into death and
so withstand it. Because of the fear death’s ubiquitousness and
finality generates, many of ethics’ knottiest challenges are
associated with end-of-life issues.
For most of the history of Western medicine, the stan-
dard of care was for physicians not to take on desperate
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1630cases in which the physician could reliably predict a high
risk of mortality. The correlate of this standard of care was
that physicians should stop treating patients who became so
desperately ill that they were likely to die.
These standards date from the time of the Hippocratic
texts, and two important concerns supported them. The
first was the physician’s self-interest. In a crowded, compet-
itive, completely unregulated market place for medical and
surgical services, practitioners who became known for los-
ing their patients would not succeed. High mortality rates
were not good for a practitioner’s reputation; indeed, high
mortality rates would mean financial ruin. Such behavior
would be foolhardy, not courageous.
The second standard arose from a keen appreciation for
the moment when medicine reaches its limits to alter the
course of disease. In the Hippocratic text, The Art, the
unknown author addresses the topic of whether physicians
should continue to treat desperate cases, those in which the
limits of medicine to prevent death have been reached.
Physicians should discontinue the care of such patients,
because to proceed with treatment is a kind of madness.
Moreover, in such cases treatment might cause unnecessary
and preventable iatrogenic harm to the patient.
The mid-20th century became for medical technology what
the Cambrian explosion was for species—a perfect storm: enter
antibiotics, intensive care units, critical monitoring, ventilators,
cardiopulmonary bypass, hyperalimentation, and megadose ste-
roids. It was a no-holds-barred atmosphere as the limits of new
technology were tested and retested. But medicine, just as all
things biologic, is cyclic, and the Hippocratic warning about
overstepping medicine’s limits began to be heeded as physicians
recovered the ancient wisdom that not every incremental reduc-
tion of mortality is worth the suffering that results from failure to
acknowledge the limits of medicine.
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a patient makes decisions about future life-sustaining treat-
ment that should be respected and implemented when the
patient is, in the attending physician’s clinical judgment, no
longer able to make decisions. The living will or directive to
physicians is used to instruct physicians about the adminis-
tration or withholding of life-sustaining treatment when
the patient has lost decision-making capacity and has a
terminal or irreversible condition (as defined in applicable
statutory law). Either through a directive to physicians or
through a medical power of attorney, a surgeon may be
validly instructed in advance by a patient with a terminal
condition that he or she does not want life-sustaining
treatment administered, especially resuscitation. Neverthe-
less, it is sometimes the case that a terminally ill patient can
benefit clinically from surgical management of problem.
When this issue first surfaced about 15 years ago, some
argued that DNR orders should be as applicable in the
operating room as they are anywhere else in the hospital.2
The argument in support of this position appeals to the
ethical principle of respect for autonomy. This principle was
understood to mean that the informed preferences of pa-
tients regarding end-of-life care should guide physicians’
clinical judgment in all clinical settings. Otherwise, advance
directives would have little meaning if surgeons could
simply override directives at the surgeon’s discretion.
Others argued that DNR orders should be suspended
in all cases when a patient was taken to surgery.3 Anesthe-
siologists and surgeons quite reasonably took the view that
intraoperative arrest of a seriously or terminally ill patient
should be regarded as a correctable side effect of anesthesia
and not a function of the patient’s underlying disease or
injury. Moreover, intraoperative resuscitation maintains
homeostasis and patients usually recover, in sharp contrast
to the overall low success rate of resuscitation elsewhere in
the hospital. It is inconsistent with the professional integ-
rity of surgical clinical judgment and practice to withhold
an intervention that is effective in achieving the goals of
surgery. Seriously or terminally ill patients who consent to
surgery can reasonably be presumed to want its functional
improvements and palliative effects, but they will not expe-
rience these outcomes if an intervention that is usually
effective in helping to achieve them is withheld. In short, a
strong case can be made on both clinical grounds and on
the basis of a reasonable assumption about patients’ prefer-
ences that DNR orders should be suspended during sur-
gery for seriously ill or terminally ill patients.
It is not enough, however, to take the view that DNR
orders should be suspended in the operating room or
because this position does not address the important ethical
question of when DNR should be reinstated postopera-
tively. There has emerged a consensus view that DNR
status should be restored when life-threatening events are
reliably judged to be owed to the patient’s underlying
terminal condition rather than to anesthesia, surgery, and
their immediate side effects.4 In the present case, a ruinous
complication has blurred the moral horizon.DNR orders mean exactly what the phrase states: Do
not initiate a cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Unlike much
of the concern when the concept originated, it does not
mean to withhold or scrimp indicated therapy. Discontinu-
ance of therapy, whether life-supporting or not, is a sepa-
rate issue. Option A is wrong.
Option C, condemning the suspension of DNR orders
because of the possible disaster it allowed is irrational. As
mentioned, the major rationale for DNR suspension during
surgical therapy is to maximize the success of the therapy by
allowing treatment of untoward effects in an atmosphere
where resuscitation is likely to be successful. The suspen-
sion ends when the operative therapy, including perioper-
ative care, is over. Option D is incorrect.
Quite the contrary to option E, DNR is widely consid-
ered to be an ethical mandate from the standpoint of
patient autonomy and allocation of resources. The College
of Surgeons policy states:
Some patients with DNR status become candidates for
surgical procedures that may provide them with signifi-
cant benefit even though the procedure may not change
the natural history of the underlying disease . . . When
such patients undergo surgical procedures and the accom-
panying sedation or anesthesia, they are subjected to new
and potentially correctable risks of cardiopulmonary ar-
rest. Furthermore, many of the therapeutic actions em-
ployed in resuscitation (for example, intubation, mechan-
ical ventilation, and administration of vasoactive drugs)
are also an integral part of anesthetic management. The
DNR status of such patients during the operative proce-
dure and during the immediate postoperative period may
need to be modified prior to operation.”5
Option B is the best choice. Therapeutic indications
and contraindications are independent of whether or not
a DNR order is in place. The focus of clinical judgment
and recommendations to the family based on it should be
on the two goals of surgical critical care. The short-term
goal of surgical critical care is to prevent imminent death,
which continued treatment is reasonably expected to
accomplish. The long-term goal of critical care is an
acceptable outcome, viewed either from the patient’s or
the physician’s perspective. In this case, there is no
ethical obligation to maintain human physiology when
the patient is no longer capable of using that physiology
for distinctively human activities and accomplish-
ments.6,7 The surgeon should explain to the patient’s
family the concept of clinical or overall futility and the
clinical ethical judgment that the obligation of the sur-
geon and family to continue life-sustaining treatment has
come to an end.
The implementation of advance directives was one of
the most notable practice-enhancing ethical landmarks
of the last century. Many patients were sacrificed will-
ingly on the altar of the goddess Lachesis (who held the
thread of life and determined its length) thinking she
could be forced to lengthen what was already cut. Now
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